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
THE CIVIL-WAR PENSION LACK-OF-SYSTEM

A FOUR-THOUSAND-MILLION RECORD
OF LEGISLATIVE INCOMPETENCE
TENDING TO
GENERAL POLITICAL CORRUPTION

By
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

Reprinted from The World's Work

"I want to say this, here and now, though I realize the effect of my vote upon this question, that \$50,000,000 a year is too big a price for the country to pay to bring me back to Congress."—Hon. WILLIAM HUGHES, M. C.—Congressional Record, January 10, 1911, page 750.



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INTRODUCTION

On Tuesday, December 12th last, the anticipated occurred. The so-called "Sherwood" or "Dollar-a-day" pension bill, referred to and discussed in the following papers, was acted upon as the earliest considerable measure taken up at the first regular session of the Sixty-third Congress; and that by a Democratic National House of Representatives pledged to an economical expenditure, "wise, efficient and effective." The vote stood 229 yeas, against 92 nays. The character of the debate, and of the speeches which preceded the taking of the vote, is elsewhere referred to. Sentimental to the last degree, it was neither creditable in tone nor in accordance with the ascertained facts of history.

The pension disbursements in the year 1910-11 because of the Civil War amounted approximately to \$150,000,000. Since the close of that war an aggregate of four thousand million dollars has been disbursed from the National Treasury, pensions paid because of physical injuries sustained, or services rendered, or alleged to have been rendered, in that struggle. Should the Sherwood "Dollar-a-day" bill become a law, it is estimated by the Pension Bureau that a further amount of \$75,000,000 a year will be added to that disbursed in 1910-11, or an increase of fifty per cent. And this, forty-seven years after Appomattox!

Under the coming allotment the country is to be parcelled out for the next ten years into 435 congressional districts. In each of these districts in 37 States, an average sum of \$400,000 will be annually disbursed under already existing legislation. Should the "Dollar-a-day" bill become a law, this annual disbursement will be further increased by \$200,000. In each of the districts in the States referred to, there is now an average of 2600 recipients of pensions.

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The natural political result of such conditions at once suggests itself.

The subject matter discussed in the following paper is momentous, reaching down as it does to the very base of our American institutions—the purity of the constituencies. The fast developing pension system is nothing more nor less than the initial step in what will, and at no remote day, surely become an established policy of general bribery and corruption. At present, in dealing with the subject, members of Congress and others are either short-sighted or foolish enough to say that, though the amount expended is large, and steadily increases, it will be but for a brief time. In ten years the “Veterans” will all, or nearly all, be dead; the thing will then stop of itself.

Nothing of the sort will occur! On the contrary, it is vastly more probable that ten years hence the pension roll of this country will be three hundred million dollars a year than that it will be less than it now is. What has hitherto been done in this way, or is now being done, is merely the entering wedge. It is so safe, as well as so personally inexpensive, for members of Congress to buy votes with the public money!

The order of future events will proceed somewhat as follows:—We now have a “Veteran” pension system affecting, on an average, about 2,600 voters in every congressional district north of the Potomac and, with a few exceptions only, in all of those west of the Mississippi. The parties openly and avowedly bid against each other for that vote—Democrat against Republican. It already involves an annual disbursement of about \$400,000 a year in each congressional district. Under the proposed “Dollar-a-day” largess measure, this amount will be increased to about \$600,000 a year in each district. Next in order will be the Volunteer Officers, Retired List, involving an annual expenditure of about \$15,000,000 a year—\$50,000 on an average, in each district. Next come the widows and dependents of the “Veterans,” involving an amount impossible now to estimate. If fixed at \$20 a month, as proposed, it will probably be \$100,000,000 a year for an indefinite future period, and affect a number of households not

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easy to calculate. That the "old militia men and teamsters and telegraphers and the other men who did so much for the Union cause" should now be given a pensionable status is next urged. And why not? They also have votes in congressional elections!

The system thus fairly inaugurated, the next move, already agitated, is to pension the Civil Service officials. These are some 300,000 in number, or about 700 in each congressional district, which, added to the 2,600 already referred to makes an aggregate of 3,400. Behind that comes the Old Age Pension System, and other gratuity projects, of which echoes from abroad and suggestions at home already reach us.

It is not too much to say, therefore, that, on the road we have now fairly entered, and upon which we by leaps and bounds are so rapidly advancing, within the next fifteen years the annual pension disbursements of this country will amount not improbably to five hundred millions, representing over a million of annual gratuities paid out in every congressional district, affecting no less than from five to seven thousand voters therein.

Under the system hitherto in vogue in this country of progressive pensions — that is, annual increases promised by candidates for office — it is not too much to say that at a not remote period the government will thus at each election be practically put up at auction. Each congressional candidate will travel through his district, hat in hand, promising to be more liberal in the way of pensions, etc., than his opponent. "Codlin's the friend, not Short. Short's very well as far as he goes, but the real friend is Codlin — not Short!" The result of such competitive election bidding any disinterested citizen can with no considerable difficulty work out for himself.

As one of the most sagacious and experienced members of the present Congress observed a short time since: — "Under the natural development of the system inaugurated by the Old-age Civil War Pension roll, within ten, or at the most fifteen, years, the pensioned dependents on the National Treasury, each looking eagerly for an early increase in the 'mere pittance' now 'doled out' to him, will represent six thousand votes to a district, or the controlling factor in almost every election."

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In this progressive system, the move immediately impending is an increase of the Old-age Veteran pensions from an aggregate of \$150,000,000 a year to one of \$225,000,000 a year, or, as has already been said, the enlargement of the annual disbursement in each of 435 congressional districts from \$400,000 to \$600,000. Of this large total, moreover, some six per cent. only is disbursed in ten states, once members of the so-called Confederacy. Ninety-four per cent. of it will be disbursed in congressional districts north of the Potomac and Ohio, and west of the Mississippi.

The writer has frequently been asked why, in face of the apparently inevitable, he assumed the not inconsiderable task of preparing the following papers. His reply is simple. Having himself done military duty in the Civil War for a period little short of four years, his sole object is, in so far as may be in his power, to bear witness against what he considers, and what many others consider, one of the most individually demoralizing and politically debauching acts of which record exists, and altogether the most ill-concealed and unblushing piece of political jobbery, corruption and bribery as yet to be found inscribed in American annals. Nor is any end to it yet in sight!

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS,
Col. and Brevet Brig. Gen. 1865.

Washington, 1 January, 1912.

THE CIVIL-WAR PENSION LACK-OF-SYSTEM

Spare at the Spigot and Spill at the Bung: The Modern Practical Observance of a Political Mandate Looking to a Wise, Efficient and Effective Administration of Public Affairs With a View to a Retrenchment of Expenditures: Campaign Promise and Congressional Performance: The Carcass and the Vultures.

THE publication known as the *Congressional Record* is an awkward, as well as an enduring fact; and, with it at hand for ready reference by political opponents, habitually to reconcile utterances and votes of a wholly contradictory tenor, involves, on the part of the average member of Congress, recourse by no means infrequent to a fineness of distinction bearing close resemblance to bare-faced sophistry. So gross is this, indeed, as at times to seem indicative of scant respect for the intelligence of those, constituents or otherwise, to confuse and deceive whom it is designed. A somewhat striking illustration of this commonplace is now apparently in order for January, 1912, an illustration to be writ large and in dollars; in fact, in the scores of millions of dollars.

The special session of the 62nd Congress, convened in April last, adjourned on the 25th of August. Called in advance of the regular date of meeting to consider and act upon the proposed commercial pact with the Dominion of Canada, Congress, in so far as was practical, confined its action to the business immediately in hand, attempting no general legislation; but, at its closing session, Mr. Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama, the official and recognized leader of the dominant party in the House of Representatives, made a statement in regard to the economies

¹The following paper appeared in separate articles in three successive numbers of the *World's Work* — that for December, 1911, and those for January and February, 1912.

in national expenditure so far effected, as a result of the incoming of the political party of which he was the mouthpiece. The amount was not considerable; in fact, as national expenditures go, it was trivial. In Mr. Underwood's own language, "the total saving in money as a result of the enforcement of Democratic policies during the present session of Congress is \$308,836.67." But he then went on further to say that "a determined effort will be made to effect proportional savings in the administration of the Government in every department"; and he added — "This House is pledged to reform the administration of public affairs and to retrench public expenditures. . . . Not a dollar will be appropriated which a careful investigation does not demonstrate should be expended in a wise, efficient, and effective administration of public affairs."

The programme to which Mr. Underwood thus committed his party was excellent as well as pronounced. The effect, however, was somewhat impaired by a subsequent remark of Ex-Speaker Cannon, to the effect that he believed "the country will not approve the waste of time over the saving of cents here and there, when the great affairs touching expenditures that aggregate nearly a thousand million dollars are neglected!" and he might have said "ignored."

The saving referred to by Mr. Underwood, so far merely in the nature of an earnest, was thus, he explicitly asserted, the first step in a systematic house-cleaning policy, both sweeping and drastic. So much for the special session of the 62nd Congress, and its *Record*. Meanwhile, throughout that session there was, from its beginning to its end, in spite of its assurances and commitments, an undertone curiously and distinctly ominous so far as any reduction of the aggregate of public expenditures was concerned — an undertone most suggestive of the ancient adage as respects saving at the spigot and wasting at the bung-hole. While a jealous and watchful eye was kept on the spigot of House expense, the pension "Bung Hole" was with difficulty kept stopped. The opening thereof, it was well understood, awaited merely a more opportune, though not remote occasion. Judging from the official report of what was said and done at

the special session, that occasion cannot apparently be deferred far beyond the beginning of the new year.

For present purposes it is not necessary here to enlarge upon the existing pension system of the United States. It is sufficient to say that the world has not heretofore in its history seen, as respects volume, anything like it — anything even approaching it. In the year 1866, that immediately following the close of the Civil War, the national appropriation for the payment of pensions, though supposedly covering, under existing legislation, cases of wounds and disability therein incurred, amounted to a little in excess of \$15,000,000, annually. Forty-five years later, in 1911, the exact amount reported as expended under that head was \$157,325,160.35, and for the three years 1909, 1910, and 1911 the average annual disbursement because of pensions considerably exceeded \$160,000,000. The exact aggregate for those years was \$487,300,304.85; a sum so large that giving it conveys no idea to the ordinary mind. In other words, fifty years after the close of the Civil War, the pension payments because of that war having increased in volume tenfold, were still on the ascending grade. And that they were still on the ascending grade was clearly indicated both in the debates and in the parliamentary action of the special session of the 62nd Congress. Moreover, that, so far as the House of Representatives was concerned, it was not then increased by an amount variously estimated at from \$20,000,000 to \$50,000,000 annually, was due solely to the fact that, by a recourse to ingenious parliamentary expedients on the part of those anxious to make a showing of economies, action was prevented on a measure upon the calendar — action both persistently and strenuously pressed. Into the nature of the expedients thus resorted to, it is for present purposes unnecessary to enter. So doing would involve the explanation of a complicated system of parliamentary procedure. The fact, however, was patent that, those responsible for the conduct of affairs knew perfectly well that could a way under the rules be found to compel a vote on the measure in question, it would have been passed by an overwhelming majority of an opposition house, pledged to a reduction in the

volume of public expenditures. And this in spite of the fact that the measure in question necessitated an increased treasury outgo of some fifty millions a year—a bare-faced largess, in no possible way contributing to a “wise, efficient, and effective administration of public affairs.”

When, in December, the 62nd Congress meets in its first regular session, recourse can apparently no longer be had to parliamentary expedients to prevent action. Like a sword of Damocles, the measure impends. It will have to be met; and it will have to be disposed of. The present purpose is to discuss the true nature of the impending measure; the reason for inferring that no adequate opposition will or can be offered to its passage; and finally, its defects, and the character of the possible measure which should be substituted for it. The modest origin and phenomenal growth of our pensions has been alluded to. Both the system and the abuses which accompanied its growth have been described in recent numbers of the *World's Work*.¹ The question is no longer of the past; that speaks for itself in the figures of a disbursement in excess of four thousand million dollars. The present discussion relates to what is proposed to be done in the immediate future; the objections to it; and, finally, the substitute policy, which, better late than never, should now be adopted.

The previous favorite measure, the passage of which was narrowly prevented by recourse to a strict observance of the rules of procedure in the Senate during the final days of the closing session of the 61st Congress, was known as the Sulloway Service Pension Bill. As reported with a favorable recommendation to the Senate, after its passage by the House, this measure would have imposed upon the Treasury an additional draft estimated by the Pension Office at \$50,000,000 a year. In a minority committee report then submitted, it was stated that, during the last four years, or since February 6, 1907, Congress had increased the pension disbursements by the sum of \$29,000,000,

¹See the series of five articles entitled “The Pension Carnival,” by William Bayard Hale, in the issues of the *World's Work* for October, November, and December, 1910, and January and February, 1911.

per annum. The act known as that of 1907 increased them by \$16,000,000, and the act of April 19, 1908, added another \$13,000,000 to this amount. And now, a simple amendment to existing laws, strongly urged, granting \$30 a month indiscriminately to every soldier of the war over 70 years of age, would, it was estimated, swell these aggregates by \$9,000,000 more. There would thus be a total increase of \$38,000,000 in the pension payments within four years. An average of, approximately, ten millions increase a year.

That preference in the order of business was not accorded this measure, and that it should, solely because of a recourse to parliamentary expedients by those opposed to it, fail of passage, was, it is needless to say, warmly resented by a large class of would-have-been beneficiaries. As one of those objecting to its precipitate consideration — a public character of long and varied legislative experience — at the time ruefully expressed it, while in daily receipt of remonstrances, nearly all “denunciatory” and many “excessively abusive,” the natural inference would be that a government now disbursing a hundred and fifty millions a year in pensions “had never done anything for the soldiers of the Civil War, and that this measure (to which precedence over other measures had been denied) was an effort to get some slight recognition for their services.”

The 61st Congress expired on the 4th of last March, and the 62nd Congress met a month later. The House of Representatives of the old Congress had been strongly Republican; that of the new was as strongly Democratic. This House had, moreover, been chosen in an outspoken spirit of protest against the extravagant and even reckless scale of public expenditure alleged to have been indulged in — a scale necessitating most onerous taxation. Thus the popular branch of the 62nd Congress was chosen under a distinct mandate — the inauguration of a system of economical reform. The cost of living, already excessive, was manifestly increasing; and a halt was accordingly called to an era of inordinate and extravagant public profusion. With an eye to this mandate, the committees of the new House were in due time appointed. Over those committees Democratic

chairmen presided; Democrats predominated in their membership. Among the committees thus appointed was that on Invalid Pensions. It met, and at once proceeded to the work assigned it — that of a reformed and economical administration involving far the largest single item of national disbursement.

As a result, it may be assumed, of full and deliberate consideration, it at last, on August 19th, reported what must be taken for its idea of an improved economical substitute for the so-called Sulloway bill — that measure which had so narrowly failed of passage by the previous Congress. Of this bill — the Sherwood bill — more presently. Meanwhile, through some parliamentary legerdemain unnecessary to consider, another measure was already before the House. This was known as the Anderson bill, and was a measure of the character usually known as a “blanket bill.” That is, it provided for an indiscriminate and large increase of pensions under provisions of the most sweeping character, including not only veterans of the war but the widows of deceased soldiers and sailors; and it was estimated that, if it became a law, it would increase the draft on the Treasury by some \$50,000,000 a year — in other words, raise that draft in the aggregate to the two hundred million mark. This bill, it was alleged, had been so to speak, “sneaked” into its position on the calendar; and the charge, which was apparently advanced in numerous papers, led, on the 31st of July, to a somewhat unseemly altercation on the floor of the House between two members, both from Ohio — General Sherwood, the chairman of the Committee on Invalid Pensions, and Mr. Anderson, a member of the committee, the introducer of the bill. Mr. Anderson asserted that, though he might have “sneaked” in his bill, he at least did not “sneak into the corridors and fail to vote when the bill came up for action,” thus intimating that the chairman of the committee, claiming paternity of another measure, had in this way sought to evade responsibility. Passing by these amenities of debate as immaterial to the main issue, it is not necessary, for present purposes, seriously to consider the so-called Anderson bill. It would, however, be difficult to suggest anything in its favor. Crude and slovenly in form, it was in its provisions indiscriminate, grossly

inequitable and wildly profuse. "Blanket" legislation of the most pronounced and vicious character, it was well calculated to promote mendicancy, destroying all sense of respect in the beneficiaries under it. But this measure has been practically superseded by the so-called Sherwood bill, formally reported, after much deliberation in committee, with one dissentient only. It thus embodies the final conclusions of sixteen members of the present House, ten of whom are Democrats, while six are Republicans. Six of the number were born subsequent to 1860, and three only saw any actual Civil War service. The measure and the accompanying report were, after presentation, referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. Under the rules it is thus in position to be called up for action on any specified Tuesday of the coming session. Over the head of the Democratic House, about to fulfil its Mandate of Economy, this bill now hangs.

In the report which accompanied this bill much space was, for appearance sake, allotted to an enumeration of economies to be effected thereby. The measure itself is framed on the basis of what is known as the "dollar-a-day pension bill," first introduced by the chairman of the present Committee, General Sherwood — "Old Dollar-a-day Sherwood" as he likes to have himself designated — then a newly elected member, early in December, 1907. Re-introduced in December, 1909, it was pending before the Committee on Invalid Pensions up to the end of the 61st Congress. In the report now accompanying its appearance in a new and perfected form, much emphasis is laid upon the fact that, during the preceding year, the Government had paid out over \$700,000 for medical boards and special examiners. It was now proposed that these boards, to a certain extent barriers against abuse, were to be done away with, as being no longer required. This was a measure of economy! Furthermore, it is stated that, during the previous year, \$300,000 was paid out for special pension examiners, nearly all of which, it was argued, could now be saved, and the money paid direct to the soldiers. A second barrier against abuse done away with in the name of economy! A further "economy" feature was that, under the sweeping pro-

visions of this measure, the Pension Bureau would be in a position largely to reduce its office force. Over \$1,000,000, it is claimed, now spent in salaries could thus be saved, and paid direct to the soldiers. And yet, even while advancing this argument, those who advance it know perfectly well that the measure they are advocating will increase the work of the Pension Bureau for years to come, necessitating a large addition to its clerical force if the avalanche of claims which pour in is to be disposed of within any reasonable estimate of the lifetime yet remaining to the "decrepit" and "halting" pension claimant. But it is so throughout! The utter futility and falseness of the arguments made and the considerations advanced by those advocating more "liberal" pension legislation are conceivable only by those who make a study of the *Record*. The audacity of assertion, plainly contradictory, exceeds belief.

Without repealing any existing pension law, or in any way modifying, restricting, or changing the laws or rules governing the payment of present pensions to the inmates of national soldiers' homes, the so-called Sherwood, or dollar-a-day bill seeks to provide that every soldier who served in the Civil War, no matter where, when, or how, for the period of ninety days should receive \$15 per month for the remainder of his life; every soldier who served 6 months, \$20; every one who served 9 months was to get \$25; and he who served one year or more, irrespective of his present age, was to receive \$30 per month. All these payments, it is to be borne in mind, were to be made to men who suffered no wound or injury during their term of service, nor incurred therein any physical disability. Such are already cared for by virtue of other legislation. The payments now provided were to be a pure gratuity, based upon the fact that the recipient, at a period nearly fifty years ago, performed some sort of military service for ninety days, or six months, or nine months, or one year or more. Upon the theory that all the money to be appropriated should go to soldiers in distress, a provision was added that no ex-soldier enjoying a net income of \$1000 a year or more, should draw any additional pension under the provisions of this

act. The word "additional" here should be noted. It is a word of much significance in this connection.

While this bill was being drafted and was still in committee, it was referred to the Pension Bureau for the usual estimate of the cost likely to be entailed thereby should it become a law. The Pension Bureau refused, however, to make the called-for estimate, on the ground that, owing to the section which excluded soldiers with a net private income per year of \$1,000 or more, no data existed upon which an estimate could be based. Thereupon the Committee proceeded to make an estimate of its own. By virtue of this "estimate," the possible number of pension recipients was reduced from 20 to 30 per cent; that number of "veterans" it was "guessed" enjoying incomes of over \$1,000 a year. Other deductions of somewhat similar character were then made; and finally an estimate — a final "guess" — was reached that the aggregate increased draft on the Treasury during the first year of the operation of the bill was not likely to exceed \$20,000,000. But, as the great mass of the claims are necessarily acted upon during subsequent years (the Bureau being swamped by the number thereof), and all operate back to the time the claim was filed, it is not unsafe to estimate that for the second year the draft made on the Treasury by virtue of this measure would be in the neighborhood of at least \$40,000,000.¹ The report then goes on to state that under this bill no provision was made for the soldiers of the Mexican War; while any further measure for the benefit of soldiers' widows, etc., was to be considered in a separate bill to be reported by another committee. It would thus appear that, under the measure now favorably acted on by the Committee on In-

¹Subsequently, the Secretary of the Interior, in an official communication addressed to the Hon. P. J. McCumber, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Pensions, estimated the aggregate number of pensioners for the several periods of service prescribed in this measure at 471,336, and the total increase of pension payments per annum at \$75,651,548. The average increase per annum per pensioner was fixed at \$106.50. It was further estimated that the number of those entitled to a rate of \$30 per month would be 357,474, implying an annual disbursement on their account alone of \$128,690,640. These totals are so considerable as to carry no significance to the average mind. Meanwhile, by way of comparison, it may be observed that the total amount paid out since the foundation of the Government on account of the War of Independence up to this time is estimated at \$70,000,000, or less than the mere increase provided for by one year's operation of the Sherwood "Dollar-a-day" bill.

valid Pensions, the \$160,000,000 paid out by the Pension Bureau, according to its report in 1910, is to be increased by the sum of from \$50,000,000 to \$75,000,000 in the not remote future; further provision being yet to be made for the soldiers of the Mexican War, for soldiers' widows, etc., etc., etc.

Sweeping and extravagant as this measure is, it does have one feature of improvement, and of marked improvement, over previous legislation. It recognizes to a certain degree the period of service—it is at least an effort in the direction of manifest justice. The ninety-days man, the six-months man, the nine-months man, and the three-years man are not all lumped together and dealt with as if the mere fact of service at all or of any sort alone called for consideration. Under this system, which has permeated all previous legislation, men who had never heard a hostile shot, or seen a Confederate flag outside of a museum, men who, as had notoriously been the case, had taken advantage of the expiration of a brief term of service to march home to the sound of the enemy's cannon after battle had been actually joined¹—such were not set down as the equals in every respect of those who went in for the whole war. A distinction was recognized between the eleventh hour recruit and he who had borne the heat and burden of the entire day. The bill was at least an attempt to recognize the one great essential distinction—differences of time in the manifold enlistments. It had in this respect much to commend it as an advance upon all previous

¹As a matter of practical experience, and speaking from the strictly military point of view, the three, six, and nine months organizations of the Civil War were worse than useless. Costly in point of money, they had a demoralizing effect upon the armies in which they served. Of use as a training-school for reenlistments for longer terms, these organizations in themselves did not know how to march, and could not be depended upon to fight. In other words, the periods of their enlistments did not afford time in which to ripen and harden them for the real work of warfare. There is in the files of the State Department a curious letter, incidentally bearing on this subject, addressed by John Lothrop Motley to Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State. Written from England a few months only after the battle of Bull Run, Mr. Motley therein gave an account of a conversation held with Earl Russell, at that time the British Foreign Secretary. Referring to the first Bull Run, Earl Russell then said he "thought that much less effect had been produced in England by the defeat and the rout than by the circumstance of so many regiments leaving on the eve of active operations because their term of enlistment had expired." As respects these short-term organizations, this was true throughout the entire conflict. They could not be depended upon. Those composing them are, however, now clamorous applicants for "more liberal pensions" in consideration of services which, as a rule, were of less than no real military value.

efforts at pension legislation. So much, at least, must be said in commendation of it.

Conceding this, the present "Sherwood" bill — that under immediate consideration — is, as presented, none the less in other respects a somewhat noticeable example of that absence of care and exactness characteristic of all "blanket" legislation. A slovenly piece of work, badly drawn, not grammatical and at points meaningless,¹ it was in these respects in thorough keeping with the mass of pension enactments. It, moreover, invites concealment, deception, fraud, and perjury. Take, for example, that clause upon which so much emphasis in the accompanying report is laid, intended to confine pension payments under this act to the needy. Under a previous pension measure of a different character reported in the Senate in 1909 (Senate 4183), it was provided that a beneficiary under that act should first "make affidavit that his income derived from private sources and including the income of his wife" did not exceed a specified amount; but in the Sherwood bill, it will be observed, it is merely provided that a pension under the act should not be paid to any soldier whose annual income is \$1000 or more. As already stated, it was then crudely estimated that from 20 to 30 per cent. of the possible beneficiaries would be excluded by the operations of this clause. If so, they must, it would appear, be excluded at their own option. No affidavit is required; no provision is made for examination of individual cases; there is no exception because of income derived from a wife. The possible beneficiary is left to settle the matter with his own conscience. Practically, the exception thus amounts to nothing. Moreover, what at most, or in any case, does it amount to? The accompanying report especially says that the bill does not repeal or modify any existing pension law. The exclusion, therefore, of cases in which the possible recipient has a private income of \$1000 or more, would only prevent his drawing the difference between the pension provided under a previous law and a pension provided under the proposed law. The economy upon which so much

¹See speech of Mr. Evans of Illinois, December 9, 1911, *Record*, 62d Congress, Second Session, pp. 144-45.

emphasis in the report is laid, thus amounts to nothing at all. It is an economical blind, devised to "save the face," so to speak, of a committee uneasily conscious of a mandate to reduce the public outgo¹.

It has already been stated that no precedent exists in the history of the human race for such indiscriminate and promiscuous giving as that already provided for under the existing pension laws of the United States, or for anything even approaching it. Of this the British Old Age Pension act is illustrative. This act — at the time of its passage deemed one of unprecedented liberality outside of our own pension system — it was estimated, would impose a draft on the Imperial Treasury of about six million sterling (\$30,000,000) a year. Experience is uniform and invariable to the effect that every measure of indiscriminate public giving far exceeds, in its practical operation, any preceding estimate made of the cost thereof. It proved so in the case of the British Old Age Pension act, the provisions of which were most general. The originally estimated disbursement of six million sterling a year, will, in the third year of the operation of the act be thirteen million — the equivalent of some \$65,000,000, in American money. The annual pension drain on the American Treasury, because of a war fought close upon fifty years ago, already considerably more than twice that amount, will, under the proposed legislation, should it become a law, exceed it by more than threefold. Nor is the limit reached, or the end even remotely in sight.

It is a safe and good rule for legislators, whether municipal, state, or national, to measure every proposed public expenditure by their individual and private standards — in other words, to do for and with the public as under similar conditions and circumstances they would do for themselves, with their own. When

¹Subsequently, this provision was stricken from the bill by a vote of 157 yeas to 93 nays. This action was markedly characteristic of the temper of the House throughout the debate on the Sherwood Bill in the following December. Any effort to limit the aggregate disbursement or to reduce in any way the number of beneficiaries under the act was manifestly repugnant to a majority of the body elected under a direct mandate to reduce public expenditures. In the course of the debate attention was emphatically called to this by Mr. Fitzgerald of New York, who said of the Sherwood Bill: — "Its enactment sounds the death knell of the hopes of the Democratic party successfully to reduce expenditures and to lower substantially tariff taxes." *Record*, December 12, 1911, page 221.

for instance, it is a question of making a draft on the public treasury, the strictly conscientious legislator would err on the right side only, should he be actuated, *mutatis mutandis*, by the same considerations of reasonable expenditure which would actuate him were he signing a check or authorizing a draft on his own bank deposit.

The matter of provision to be made for those who for any reason are insufficiently provided for, is no new question. On the contrary, in one form or another, it has, as a problem, occupied the attention of the individual man, the legislator, and the business administrator or director almost since the beginning of time. And if, as a result of all human experience, through largesses, distributions, charitable bequests and foundations, poor-laws and work-houses, doles, out-door reliefs, asylums, and pensions — the *panem et circenses* of all times and kinds — one fact stands forth more distinct and indisputable than most others, it is that promiscuous and indiscriminate benefactions and givings are a curse to all concerned. In such case the demand always exceeds the supply; feeding on itself, the thing fed grows with an exceeding growth. Impairing self-respect, it saps the desire of self-help. It creates dependents and begets mendicants.

It remains to apply these rules of action and results of experience to the United States pension legislation. Did any one ever hear of a private individual or a large business concern which, in providing for employees and dependents, pursued the policy which has for the last thirty years been pursued by the United States Congress, as respects what are known as the "veterans" of the Civil War, or those dependent upon them? Did any one, either in a private capacity, a corporate capacity, or a public capacity, ever hear of a system under which equal amounts were distributed in the form of annuities to every one who had been in a public or private or corporate employ, at a given period of time — provided only it was in excess of ninety days — and wholly irrespective of his means, present occupation, earning capacity, or physical condition? A private individual who, dealing with his own funds, adopted such a policy, would unquestionably at an early day be in bankruptcy; provided

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always he was not put under guardianship by a court-of-law on petition of members of his family or those dependent on him. The directors of a business corporation, no matter how large, who pursued such a policy, would unquestionably be held personally liable for perversion of corporate funds. Yet this is exactly the course which, in the case of the Civil War pension roll, has, for the last thirty years, been pursued by a succession of Congresses.

Custom has habituated the country to the spectacle; and the extreme crudeness, and consequent waste and incidental abuses and corruption of the system are taken as matters of course. They excite neither notice nor criticism. To realize the situation it becomes necessary to get a glimpse of it objectively — to see ourselves as others must see us. Let a case be supposed. Reference has already been made to the British Old Age Pension system. By virtue of that act, ill-considered in many respects and confessedly open to grave criticism, weekly payments are made under clauses necessarily general in their phraseology, to all persons coming under their purview. These of course are numbered by tens of thousands. Now let it be assumed that, in addition to general legislative action, Parliament were to assume both administrative and judicial functions; inviting individual applications, exceptional in character, and undertaking to pass upon each separate appeal; granting special exemptions and favors, and in cases even correcting and setting aside the judgments and sentences of judicial tribunals, declaring him not a criminal who is a criminal of record; and if this were done habitually and in thousands of cases each year (pensioning and pardoning being recognized as a parliamentary perquisite) such a system, indiscriminate, illogical, wasteful and confused, we would at once pronounce unworthy of a civilized country and impossible of continued operation. Yet that is the exact system in use in the United States. As a result of its workings, a hundred and sixty million dollars were, in 1910, drawn out of the Treasury, and under those workings it is proposed to draw out over two hundred and twenty-five millions in 1913. Were this not a fact, the statement of it would seem incredible.

The question, therefore, naturally suggests itself, why is such a system continued? And much more, how has it come about that the extension of such a system is not only proposed but is so sure of passage, that, can it once be brought to a vote, action can be forestalled only by recourse to parliamentary expedients? To any one who makes a study, even a superficial study, of existing conditions, the answer is obvious. Much has been heard of late of the trusts and of great trade combinations which control legislation, greatly to the public detriment, while more conducive yet to private emolument — “predatory wealth,” the phrase goes. It is safe, however, to say that there is to-day in Washington, or in the world, no influence which, in its power to break down opposition and to bring about the legislative results it desires, is at all comparable to the influence which has grown up and become organized under the existing United States pension system. That system disburses eight score millions a year. Wherever disbursements on any account run into the millions, the opportunity for what is known as “pickings” cannot but exist. To that rule no exception can be found. The Commissioner of Pensions, in his report for the year ending June 30, 1910, states that more than 25,000 recognized attorneys practise before the Bureau. During the year 1909 more than \$320,000 of public money was disbursed among them. He further states that there was a marked increase in the amount of attorneys’ fees paid, due to claims filed and allowed under an act passed during the previous year. Every “blanket” act implies an enormous increase of attorneys’ fees. A most fair-faced and plausible, but altogether deceptive clause from time to time appears in these acts to the effect that no money under the provisions thereof shall be paid to attorneys. The clause amounts to absolutely nothing. This was curiously demonstrated in the case of possible beneficiaries under the various pension laws after the Spanish War. “On the return of the army from the Philippine Islands, most of the troops were mustered out in San Francisco. In advance of their arrival at that point, the pension attorneys of Washington hurried to the spot to open offices or have their agents ready to meet the return-

ing soldiers. According to the language of the soldiers themselves the rival agents beset them at once, importuning them to file their claims for pensions without delay. To the bewildered youth eager only to reach their homes, seventy-five attorneys seemed to be pursuing each victim, assuring him that it was his duty to file his application, whether an invalid or not. The hospitals had to be guarded against these tormentors masquerading as friends of the invalids." In the case of a single regiment composed of officers and men of exceptional physical excellence, 477 applications for pensions were filed within four months, for over twenty different diseases!

"Wheresoever the carcass is there will the eagles be gathered together." For "carcass" in the above biblical aphorism read "Pension largess" and, for "eagles," "vultures," and the situation with us as respects pension attorneys is not inadequately set forth. For them, each fresh "blanket" bill spells — "Harvest!" And it is safe to say that, if the exigencies of legislation called for it, every one of the 25,000 attorneys practising before the Pension Bureau could be depended upon for at least one telegram to some member of Congress. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to assert that, at a single indication amounting merely to a warning from the sentinel "vulture," from twenty to thirty thousand telegrams would in a single day be poured in upon Congress. The pressure also could be directed exactly at the points where pressure was most necessary or desirable. Outside of congressional circles, few have any idea of the influences which can thus be brought to bear. It is to be remembered also that, on the other side, nothing is heard. What is every one's business is proverbially no one's business; and any member of Congress, whether Senate or House, questioned on the point, would state that to one letter or message of protest against some "blanket" act involving the expenditure of tens of millions, he will receive at least a hundred urgent messages demanding its passage. If, moreover, any member of Congress raises his voice against such a measure, he becomes at once the recipient of letters of remonstrance, some indignant, others abusive and threatening. Most rarely, however, does he get a letter of com-

mendation or sympathy. The logical result follows. Members of Congress are somewhat exceptionally human.

Looked at from another point of view, the political influence in favor of any and every additional pension measure, no matter what its character, is apparent, and even more startling than apparent. On the 30th of June last, there were upon the rolls of the Pension Office the names of over 880,000 recipients. These of course, are unequally distributed. They represent, however, on an average, considerably more than 2,000 recipients for each present congressional district of the country. In Indiana, for instance, there are 4,176 pensioners to a district; in Maine there are 3,773. The six New England states average 2,985 recipients to each district. In twelve other states — New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Kansas — the districts average a trifle more than 2,800 each. On the other hand, in the eleven states which constituted the Confederacy, represented in the aggregate by 98 members of Congress, there are but 754 recipients to a district. The two states of the Confederacy having the largest number of pensioners are Arkansas and Tennessee with a fraction more than 1,640 to a district; but Georgia with eleven representatives averages 310 pensioners only to each district; while South Carolina with seven representatives has but 275. In seven former Confederate states having an aggregate of sixty-eight representatives, the pensioners average 490 only to a district, as compared with 3,258, the average in six populous Northern states returning 89 members of the House. Furthermore, the pensioners in the Southern states referred to are, presumably, nearly all pensioners coming down from earlier wars — the Mexican War or even that of 1812 — and the provisions of the pending Sherwood bill, with its fifty millions of increased annual outgo, affect the states named in no appreciable degree;¹

¹Less than 6 per cent. of the total amount paid out for pensions is disbursed in ten states which include 25 per cent. of the whole number of congressional districts. This fact accounts for the extreme eagerness of the present House of Representatives to make most liberal provision in any pension act that might be passed for the surviving "veterans" of the Mexican War. It was desired to conciliate the states of the old Confederacy, giving them what is known in Washington as their "share of the pork." On this subject Mr. Edwards of Georgia, made some exceptionally well considered and suggestive remarks in the course of the final debate on the Sherwood bill. (*Record*, December 12, 1911, pp. 235-6.)

while, on the other hand, six Northern states — Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Kansas — have at least 120,000 would-be beneficiaries under that bill, averaging not less than 1,300 to a congressional district.

For reasons that at once suggest themselves, no considerable opposition to this indiscriminate but unequal distribution of public money has as yet been made by the representatives of the Southern states; though, in addition to their share of the heavy burden of taxation imposed generally by the national pension payments, each of these states supports a local system making provision for the disabled and necessitous yet living, among those furnished by it to the armies of the Confederacy. Incidentally, it may be observed that some of those Confederate pension measures as respects administration as well as the measure of relief furnished, might well afford material for congressional study. Carefully framed, while assisting the deserving and needy, they do not hold out temptation to fraud or actively stimulate and foster mendicancy. For instance, under the pension law of South Carolina there is a provision that property sufficient to produce \$75 in the applicant's own or his wife's name, debars a possible beneficiary from receipt of a pension. Furthermore, it is credibly asserted that in the Confederacy the veteran "who possesses even a moderate competence, who has sons or daughters able to provide for him, would regard it as a humiliation to be offered a pension by the State."

II

Pension Beneficiaries as a Political Factor and Menace: Those Once Battle-scarred now the Battle-scarred: The Travesty of Special Enactments: The Conscription Scarecrow: The Bounty Jumper and Deserter: President Lincoln on "Rottenness" in the Army of 1862: More than 500,000 Cases of Recorded Desertion.

REFERRING, in April last, incidentally and in the course of some remarks on another but cognate subject, to the Civil War pension system, the present Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Franklin MacVeagh, observed that it had lost its patriotic aspects and now become a political list. In Washington this fact is understood and appreciated; for, while it is true that all pensioners are not actual voters, it is equally true that those who are not voters, largely women, when it comes to political action are probably more formidable as factors than an equal number of the opposite sex. As petitioners for relief, women are apt to be both tearfully importunate and persistently persuasive; men, when not sympathetic, are notoriously good-natured. As a class the pensioners, whether male or female, act as a unit; and exciting the hostility of the pensioners is to a politician like challenging an organized phalanx actuated throughout by the strongest motives of self-interest. Of this fact Secretary MacVeagh afforded a good illustration as a result of his altogether truthful assertion just referred to. It excited a storm of angry protest, which was perhaps best and most typically voiced by a leading orator on the following Decoration Day, who declared that the Secretary had recently made himself ridiculous "by raising an outcry against pensions"; adding, "if I were President of the United States and had such an ingrate in my Cabinet, I

would fire him as far as Chicago so quickly it would make his head swim." Let one example suffice; but generally it may not unsafely be asserted that if any member of Congress,—or indeed citizen in private life of sufficient prominence to excite remark at all—ventures on a criticism, much more an analysis, of the pension roll, he may with tolerable certainty count on a response in no way dissimilar to that visited on Secretary MacVeagh; nor need he hope for either fairness of treatment or moderation of speech. He may, on the contrary, rest assured that the denunciation will be personal, abusive and mendacious—that usually experienced from the sturdy and persistent mendicant to whom alms are denied. To the outsider, this, in accordance with the everlasting order of things, matters little; but to him who is playing the game of politics it counts for much. It may to-day safely be asserted that any member of Congress representing a district north of the Potomac, who dares to criticize, much less to challenge a measure involving an increase in the appropriation for pension payments, practically takes his political life in his hand.

Massachusetts furnishes an example. Under the last census fourteen congressional districts were apportioned to Massachusetts. The average number of pensioners in each district of Massachusetts is just 2,700. At the election in November, 1910, in which the members of the present Congress (62d) were chosen, the vote in Massachusetts, Republican and Democratic, was almost exactly equal, 203,136 Republican, 203,624 Democratic. In five districts in which an aggregate of 182,000 votes were cast, the total of the pluralities of the successful candidates, one way or the other, amounted to only 2,806. In those six districts there were probably 18,000 pensioners. The average plurality to a district was 450. Such figures speak for themselves.

It is idle as well as false to assert in this connection that the pensioner, in point of fact, has not made himself actively felt as a political factor. The contrary is susceptible of proof. In recent debates in Congress it was asserted that, during the campaign of 1910, United States Senators went through certain sharply contested districts, throwing their whole weight for or

against the respective candidates on the pension issue alone. It was urged in advocacy of one man that he had introduced a "dollar-a-day" pension bill; while against another it was charged that his whole course had been one consistent effort to "fool the soldier." Elsewhere districts were flooded with letters and circulars emanating directly from the organization of pension applicants, advocating or opposing candidates on this issue, and this issue alone. Statements to this effect made openly in course of debate met with no denial. Members of Congress who had been defeated for reelection attributed that result to these circulars. Thus, when Secretary MacVeagh, in the occasional speech which has been referred to, spoke of the pension list as no longer a Roll of Honor, but as a political list, he used language of moderation. He might truthfully and fairly have referred to it as an enormous instance of political jobbery of the most far-reaching character, deeply affecting, both in its direct and its indirect outcome, not merely the Treasury, but the moral health and lasting well-being of the whole body politic. In plain English, the legislation under that head is to a large extent simply a disguised method of bribery and corruption on the largest possible scale, and with money paid out of the National Treasury instead of from the pockets of candidates.

Take, for instance, the gross abuse of special pension legislation as a political factor. Since 1861 there have been granted to individuals under special acts no less than 32,401 original pensions or increases of existing pensions. In the 39th Congress, that immediately succeeding the close of the Civil War, when exceptional cases of peculiar hardship were naturally fresh in memory or sight, 138 cases only were provided for in this way. Subsequently it became an understanding in Congress that each member of either house was entitled, as a perquisite or special bit of personal pocket patronage, to two acts at a session — a sort of congressional extra. The custom thus obtained a foothold; the usual result followed. In the second session of the 61st Congress there were 6,063 individual cases provided for by special acts, at rates varying from \$6 a month, of which there were three, to \$100 a month, of which there was a single instance.

The great mass of beneficiaries, far exceeding in number all others combined, were those to whom was granted \$24 a month of which there were 2,639, and those granted \$30 a month of which there were 1,921 — in all, 4,560 cases of beneficiaries at either \$24 or \$30 a month. And this by special acts including perhaps 600 beneficiaries in a lump, passed with hardly a word of debate, and no criticism or remonstrance. These figures represent an average of rather more than thirteen special beneficiaries to each member of either house, in a single session thereof. A very respectable bit of patronage, which the average Senator and Representative feels little disposition to forego! The question naturally suggests itself: how would it be under conditions at all analogous were that Senator or Member acting for himself or as the director of a business corporation — much more as a trustee, which last a legislator in strictness is? A breach of trust, such action is a travesty of legislation.

Nor, in this respect, is the outlook alluring; for, during the special session of the 62d Congress, just closed, the records show what may not unfairly be described as a flood of special cases presented and referred to the proper committees, sometimes as many as thirty by a single member in one day's sitting; and it has been officially stated that 30,000 applications of this character are now on file in the office of the proper House Committee alone.

The condition of affairs existing in the room of that committee at the beginning of the last session of the 61st Congress was indeed forcibly set forth in a report presented December 15, 1910, by Mr. Fuller, one of its members, speaking on its behalf. The really curious thing, however, in connection with the report referred to, was its unconscious betrayal of the mental condition, as respects what is known as a system of constructive legislation, of the member who drew the document up, and of the committee which authorized its presentation; for it was therein stated that there was not a member of either branch of Congress who was not besieged with hundreds of applications for relief by special act, there being no "existing law to cover these distressing cases." The report then goes on to say: "The pension committees of Congress, working by night and by day, have been able

to bring relief to a few thousand soldiers, yet in comparison with the thousands who are still knocking at its doors for help, it is but a drop in the bucket. In this Congress alone, there has been referred to the two pension committees of the House of Representatives, more than 20,000 bills for private legislation."

The committee in question is thus depicted, graphically though unconsciously, as a shifting and necessarily unorganized charity bureau, indiscriminately distributing money not its own.

Under these circumstances, it might naturally be supposed that a committee composed of men of average intelligence and business experience would reach the conclusion that, when the exceptional cases under the system in use had grown to such dimensions and the system itself had fairly broken down, some other system — a system based on well-considered, constructive legislation — was altogether desirable, indeed, quite essential; for such alone would meet the exigencies of the situation. Nothing of the sort seems to have suggested itself. On the contrary, all that the committee had to propose was the passage of yet another "blanket" bill of the customary, indiscriminate kind, raising existing pensions in a lump and to an extent which would constitute an additional fifty-million draft on the Treasury. It was then innocently observed that, though this was a large sum to be added to the present pension appropriation of \$160,000,000 a year, yet it was necessary to grant it if Congress was to be relieved of a vast amount of special pension legislation! That the passage of the proposed bill would only increase the scale but in no degree correct the evil referred to, seems no less apparent than that, just so long as the old system is thus continued, special cases of particular alleged individual hardship will arise, and importunately present themselves. Members of Congress will, moreover, be just as desirous of at once signaling their fidelity to their duties and incidentally making themselves solid with their constituencies by obtaining consideration for such applications on the new scale as they were on the old. Thus, the whole experience of forty years went in this case for nothing. The general increase proposed was simply, in other words, another entering wedge.

But, in other respects, the debate on the so-called Fuller bill (January 10, 1911), which accompanied this report, and the speeches — not delivered in the course thereof, but subsequently published by permission in the *Record* (January 12, 1912)— are curiously, and far from pleasantly, suggestive to one who actively participated in the military operations of the Civil War. Rhetorical, and evidently intended for use in the various districts of the members thus delivering themselves, they certainly are not indicative of close acquaintance with the facts in the case, or even of desire to present those facts with any approach to either accuracy or realism.

It is, of course, to be borne in mind that nearly all those responsible for the utterances referred to, besides being politicians, were born either subsequent to the Civil War, or had not at that time attained an age of distinct memory, much less of accurate knowledge. Accordingly, those engaged in the war are uniformly referred to in somewhat stilted terms as “veterans” and “heroes”; as being “battle-scarred,” and invariably as “deserving and worthy”; men who “enlisted at the call of duty with no thought of emoluments, pay, or pension. They were patriots then and they are patriots now”; — and so forth and so on! Furthermore they are uniformly described as “old and infirm, some blind, some crippled, some bed-ridden; most of them poor and many destitute.” It is furthermore alleged of them as a body that those who are not dependent on others or the public for support constitute “so few exceptions as to be negligible.”

To those who themselves personally took part in the struggle, none of these statements or implications commend themselves. They are simply absurd in their exaggeration. Speaking coldly, and bearing witness as one personally acquainted with the facts in the case, the army of the Union, numbering more than two million, was a very miscellaneous body, composed of material of all sorts and conditions; and this, moreover, was a necessary result of the radically vicious and wasteful system pursued in recruiting its loss and waste.

The original enlistments, those of the first eight months following April, 1861, constituted probably as fine a body of raw

military material as was ever got together. It was composed of the very pick of American youth of that period. Those men did indeed enroll themselves in a storm of enthusiasm and from a sense of duty. Enlisting for three years, and at the expiration of those three years to a large extent reënlisting, they formed the nucleus of the Union Army. Too much cannot be said in their praise.

The beginning of a war is always in the nature of a picnic — a stimulating novelty; everyone is anxious to have a hand in it, in some shape or manner. Men almost shed tears if rejected as recruits. But after the glow of the first call to arms dies away, and real war reveals its grim, repulsive aspect, the response to each renewal of that call-to-arms grows less and less in volume; until, in the case of our Civil War, within the very first year of the struggle (April, 1862) volunteering practically ceased. Under such circumstances, as everyone at all informed on that subject knows perfectly well, there is but one true course to pursue — recourse should be had to a system of conscription, exacting, stern, and even cruel. Permitting the fewest possible grounds of exemption, it should accept no excuses. Our Government in the Civil War, however, never dared have a real recourse to that drastic but alone effective measure. Conscription, in the states of the Confederacy, a stern, unrelenting reality, was in the loyal states a scarecrow. Enacted under the pressure of necessity into a law, that law was used as a threat to compel local communities to band together to fill their quotas — somehow! Recourse was then naturally had to the bounty system; and this early in the second year of the war. The frightful losses incurred in McClellan's Peninsular Campaign thus had to be made good.

The communities, local and otherwise, then combined; enlisting agencies were established; and men sold themselves and were bought and delivered singly and in lots at so much a head, like cattle. It was a wretched system, cowardly, wasteful, inhuman; but, under it — and it was pursued for three years — men were quoted much as bullocks at Smithfield — a fair average valuation being, say, three to six dollars a pound — the only

difference from the Smithfield basis of dealing being that quality was not considered. Anything went!

Needless to say, the material forwarded to the front under such a system — the bogus conscription system — constantly deteriorated. In the army, this was notorious — notorious not only to everyone who held a commission, but to every man in the ranks called upon to associate with those forwarded under guard to fill up the war-worn battalions. Desertion and “bounty-jumping,” having become a calling, were reduced to a system. As the war went on, the “recruits,” recent importations from Europe, or picked up in the slums and from the gutters of the great cities, were notoriously looked upon by the veterans of '61 with averted eyes — objects of contempt; they were treated with scant consideration. Yet these, “the cankers of a calm world and a long peace,” to a large extent, constituted what are now known as “war-worn veterans,” “glorious heroes,” and “worthy patriots!”

To one who personally recalls the events of that struggle — its hard, realistic and mercenary features — the present day utterances concerning it are a constant source of amused astonishment. In skimming over the columns of the *Congressional Record*, such cannot but marvel at the amount of cant and fustian — nauseating twaddle, perhaps, would not be too extreme a term — deemed useful properly to lubricate the creaking district machinery. Any detailed recurrence to the facts and evidence is, however, apt to be denominated “muckraking,” and denounced as such. Perhaps, however, a brief reference in this connection might be permitted to such standard authorities as Mr. James Ford Rhodes's History, and Secretary Gideon F. Welles's Diary. Mr. Rhodes would inform the gushy members of Congress referred to that — “The Government, the states, the counties, and other political divisions were munificent in their offers of bounties, of which a salient example is seen in the advertisement of the New York Volunteer Committee: ‘30,000 Volunteers Wanted.’ The following are the pecuniary inducements offered: ‘County bounty, cash down, \$300; State bounty, \$75; United States bounty to new recruits, \$302; additional to

veteran soldiers, \$100'; making totals, respectively, of \$677 and \$777 for service which would not exceed three years, which was likely to be less, and which turned out to be an active duty of little more than one year — besides the private soldiers' pay of \$16 per month with clothing and rations. The bounty in the county of New York was more than that generally paid throughout the country, although in some districts it was even higher." As respects the "bounty-jumper," the inevitable product of such a system, Mr. Rhodes next says:—"The Provost-Marshal-General stated in his final report that 'A man now in the Albany penitentiary, undergoing an imprisonment of four years, confessed to having jumped the bounty thirty-two times.' It was stated that 'out of a detachment of 625 recruits sent to reinforce a New Hampshire regiment in the Army of the Potomac, 137 deserted on the passage, 82 to the enemy's picket line, and 36 to the rear, leaving but 370 men.'" (Rhodes, Vol. IV, pp. 430-1.)

Recurring next to the recently published diary of Gideon F. Welles, President Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy, the following is from the report, written down at the time, of a species of council of magnates held at the White House, September 1, 1862, before the war was yet eighteen months old: " . . . In these remarks the President concurred, and said he was shocked to find that of 140,000 whom we were paying for in Pope's army only 60,000 could be found. McClellan brought away 93,000 from the Peninsula, but could not to-day count on over 45,000. As regarded demoralization, the President said, there was no doubt that some of our men permitted themselves to be captured in order that they might leave on parole, get discharged, and go home. Where there is such rottenness, is there not reason to fear for the country?" — (Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. I, p. 117.) Later on, as is well known, Andersonville put an effectual stop to that familiar game; but it went briskly on at first. Lincoln and his advisers called it "rottenness"; but now they differentiate it in Congress as only a form of *nostalgia*! The poor lads, fresh from their innocent homes, labored under such an uncontrollable desire to get back to their mammas and the vine-covered cottage,

that they instinctively sought the enemy's lines as being the most direct road thereto. They were, however, all good boys, though a bit guileless perhaps; but, all "heroes" now, every one, without discrimination, is to have for life a dollar a day pension money!

Historically speaking, it is a fact not to be denied that the bounty-bought material constituted a large percentage of the whole Civil War levy — how large it is impossible to say; but it certainly sounds strange to the ears of those personally cognizant of the facts, and is, to say the least, an incorrect use of language to assert that those men enlisted without "thought of emoluments, pay or pension." They did nothing of the kind; nor were they "patriots" either then or now. They sold themselves for bounty money; and they got it! Simply and avowedly mercenaries, they were constantly referred to by the older and more reliable as the "seven-dollars-a-pound fellows." As food for powder, such were paid at the time all, and more than all, they were worth. And to the truth of every word of this statement any officer who had, during the last two years of the war, charge of recruits on their way to the front — and there were many such — can bear testimony still. The great difficulty of preventing these "patriots" and "worthy soldiers" from deserting the moment they had handled their bounty money was one of the problems of the service. Then, far more battle-scared than now battle-scarred, they are indiscriminately pensioned as "disinterested heroes!"

Much the same tone of reckless exaggeration is noticeable in the references made to the present condition of those who served. It is little less than a libel to speak of them as a class as prematurely old, or decrepit, or unable to support themselves, or as dependents, or as a band of virtual paupers. As a mass they do not in any of these respects differ from the great body of other American citizens. It was asserted in the recent congressional debate referred to that there are some 800,000 or 900,000 of these men still surviving. This again was a gross exaggeration. There are in fact somewhere in the neighborhood of half a million; but, speaking of the survivors of the Civil War as a whole, wounds

and disabilities apart — and such cases are liberally provided for in the pension acts — there was nothing connected with the service or life in the army which differentiated such in any noticeable respect from those who had passed through no similar experience. The drunkard, the “bounty-jumper,” the deserter, the malingerer, the “dead beat,” after his term of service expired, was just what he was before it began. He in time became a dependent, in many cases a pauper. He was born that way, and traveled to his destined end; but the great mass of those who obtained an honorable discharge, especially those of volunteering days, were subsequently self-respecting and self-supporting, and such as survive to-day are as well-to-do and quite as sufficiently provided for as the average American. Two years after Cromwell’s Puritan army of the British Commonwealth was disbanded, following the Stuart restoration in 1660, the Royalist office holder, Samuel Pepys, wrote in his diary, “of all the old army now you cannot see a man begging about the street; but what? You shall have this captain turned a shoemaker; the lieutenant a baker; this a brewer; that a haberdasher; this common soldier a porter; and every man in his apron and frock, etc., as if they never had done anything else.” And much the same might have been said of the earlier enlistments of the Civil War during the years that immediately followed its close. Then the politicians and pension-mongering vote-buyers got after them with the usual demoralizing result. Even then they were and are as other American citizens; and surely it would be a libel on the average of American citizens to assert that the greater part of them, or indeed that more than a small percentage, are unable to obtain even the necessities of life without assistance from the public. Those who composed the bone and sinew of the army of the Union were in these respects certainly not below the American average. To assert of them, as has been asserted in Congress, that 96 per cent. of them would be paupers if they were not pensioners — a grotesque perversion of facts — is remote from the truth.

So also as respects deserters, toward whom, judging by the *Record*, a most lenient congressional disposition exists — “amend-

ing" or "correcting" the record, the wise call it. Bills to effect this result — in other words bills seeking by legislative action to set aside court records — are introduced by the score on every private-bill legislative day. All duly referred, they were formerly acted upon by committees so carelessly, and consequently so favorably, that the thing grew to be a scandal. The committees were finally notified that the President would feel obliged to veto such acts. Measures looking to a "correction of records" with a view to the extended drawing of pensions have, accordingly, dwindled in number. Nevertheless, our Civil War annals, as respects desertions, are not pleasant reading. As a matter of history, the subject has never been thoroughly investigated; but this, together with the bounty abuse just referred to, would constitute for youthful and rhetorical members of Congress a field of inquiry at once fruitful and instructive. If called for, or if the assertions here made are challenged, the record can be produced. That muck-heap would not require much raking to yield malodorous results.

For present purposes it can be briefly disposed of. It has been asserted that, in the whole course of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, so far as the German army was concerned, there were recorded but seventeen cases of established desertion. The reason is obvious. The deserter from that service had nowhere to go. His apprehension was certain; the consequences thereof, not less so. In our Civil War it was otherwise; and the official records of the Adjutant-General's office at Washington report the almost incredible number of 508,494 as the grand total of desertions during the war, a number exceeding twenty-five per cent. — one quarter part — of the total enlistments! And "at the close of the Civil War, notwithstanding the many efforts of the Government, through the promise of pardon and restoration to duty, to secure their return, there were still 117,247 deserters at large, exclusive of non-reporting drafted men." Largely congressional "heroes" and "worthy soldiers" now; and, in altogether too many cases, the recipients of "liberal pensions"!

But in gentle and kindly extenuation of this terrible but in-effaceable record it is sometimes urged that the number was

largely, if not in greatest part, made up of men who, having served faithfully until hostilities ceased, then disappeared, or failed to report back for duty, because of their eagerness to return to their families and to civil life. That some such cases occurred is indisputable; but they were only rare exceptions. As any company or regimental officer who served in that war knows and will testify — General Isaac R. Sherwood of Ohio, for example — those men who, having served in the war, served it out, were not indifferent whether the word “Deserter” was then inscribed against their names on the last regimental muster-roll. Proud of what they had done, they wanted honorable discharge. Beyond this, the deserter forfeited his pay and emoluments; he forfeited transportation to his home. The plea in extenuation just stated shows in fact only the simple-minded ignorance — the charitable disposition perhaps — of him who advances it. Those who witnessed what was probably the most notable display of the nineteenth century — the review of the Union army at Washington after the close of hostilities — cannot but retain a distinct recollection of the occasion, and of the character and bearing of the men who figured in it. How many of those who there tramped in review before President and Commander-in-Chief is it supposed subsequently deserted, without pay and transportation, in their eagerness to get back to their families and homes? Safe to say, not one!

But, as matter of history, the deserter was, in the army of the Union, referred to with scorn and treated with contumely; and any one who commanded either a company or a regiment will now bear witness that those who deserted from it were almost invariably of the scum and dregs thereof. As a rule, their absence, unaccounted for, was better than their “Present” at roll-call. One and all, they then deserved to be shot; now, by act of Congress, they are pensioned by the score! More extraordinary still, not infrequently a suggestion has been heard on the floor of Congress to this effect — “Isn’t it about time to let up on the deserters?” As respects such, the “blanket” pension bill is unquestionably convenient. Nor was it with undue strength of speech that Mr. Underwood, the leader of the majority

in the present House, recently referred in debate to a measure of this description, which it was proposed to introduce out of the regular order, as "a bill to pension deserters who have had the charge of desertion removed by this House; to pension men who were never within five hundred miles of a firing line; men who did not serve over thirty days in the army." And, when his attention was called to the fact that the particular "blanket" bill then in question provided for a somewhat longer period of service, he answered with a manifest sneer: "Yes, it says ninety days instead of thirty days!"

It remains to consider the measure of remedial constructive legislation manifestly called for to meet such conditions. One of those who last winter participated in the House debate on the so-called Sulloway bill, truly observed that, if our national pension system policy were "tested by the pension policy of any civilized government in history, such a measure as that then proposed [the Sulloway bill], ignoring the cardinal factors of merit and need, could never stand. The country has already gone too far in the pension policy in confounding the deserving with the undeserving, and the stupendous expenditures for unworthy cases is sure at last to imperil the cause of the deserving. The time has come when our pension policy is tending to pauperize able-bodied men and restrict the funds available for really needy soldiers and their dependents." The facts thus stated are indisputable; but, before considering the remedy, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the cause of the scandal and abuse.

III

The Pension Bureau an Overworked Factory of Pauperism: Mendicancy Stimulated: Self-support at a Discount: The Entering Wedge and the Flying Wedge: The Volunteer Officers' Retired List: Special Enactments by the Thousand: A Committee Worked Day and Night: A System of Publicity Necessary to a Purging of the Roll of Honor: The Great Desideratum, Constructive and Scientific Pension Legislation as a Substitute for the Blanket, Makeshift, Piecemeal Travesty of Such Now in Operation.

FORTY-SIX years after the echoes of the last gun discharged in the Civil War had died away, it was officially estimated that rather more than 550,000 of those who served therein in any military capacity still survived, and that 96 per cent. of those surviving were the recipients of pensions. Such a statement, including, as the aggregate of survivors necessarily must, those whose term or character of service was merely nominal, those who were in advance paid for all they did, and paid most liberally, those who are otherwise amply provided for, and those who for various causes are undeserving of assistance — and when men gathered up promiscuously are numbered by the hundreds of thousands the percentage of such is of necessity invariably large — taking all these cases into consideration, the statement speaks for itself. Such a showing is not creditable. On its face it is suggestive of reckless and indiscriminate giving on the part of the public, and of fraud and false pretence on the part of the recipients. That more than one quarter of those who genuinely participated in a war half a century ago still survive is, to say the least, surprising. If substantiated, however, the fact speaks volumes for the excellent physical condition in which they came out of it. On the other hand, the implication that no

less than ninety-six out of a hundred of these survivors of the stalwart American youth of 1861, are now if not virtually paupers yet dependent for a comfortable support on others or on the public, is certainly in no degree conducive to an increased national self-complacency. The simple fact is, neither of the things stated is really so. No such number of proper and worthy recipients of public assistance survive; no such proportion (96 per cent.) of average American citizens of any class stand in need of assistance from the public. If any faith at all can be put in the statistics of American life, or, throwing statistics aside, if any reliance can be put on ordinary, every-day observation, it is manifest that more than half of the enormous sum (\$157,325,160.35) thus expended in 1910-11 was worse than thrown away; that is, if the rule universally deduced from human experience — that profuse and indiscriminate giving is a curse — holds good in this case also. That our pension system tends to pauperize the community by undermining that sense of self-respect always incident to self-support, hardly admits of denial; that indiscriminate giving, regardless of individual requirements, restricts the funds available for the relief of the truly deserving and really needy, is a self-evident proposition. That such a condition of things calls for reform is obvious; but before a proper measure of reform can be devised, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the real cause of difficulty — the root of the evil.

In the case of the pension system, that root of evil is found in the legislative policy which has for nearly thirty years been steadily followed in regard to it — a piecemeal, instalment-plan policy, gradually assuming shape through an ill-considered succession of progressive “blanket bill” enactments. In other words, while perpetually legislating, no measure has ever been even suggested which professed, much less which was intended, to be comprehensive and final. Itself avowedly an entering wedge, the passage of each measure is forced through by a system of tactics which might most aptly be described as the “flying wedge.” In other words, the organization having this legislation in charge — the General Pension-Staff, we will call it —

first considers what can probably be obtained under conditions at the time prevailing — the particular political party in control, the state of the Treasury, and the greater or less proximity of an election. A measure is then introduced intended for immediate action, with a distinct intimation that further and ulterior results are in view, but reserved for a more opportune occasion! The measure selected is as much as can probably be made to go now. As the result of a varied experience stretching through the lifetime of an entire generation, the General Pension-Staff is well advised as respects both pension strategy and congressional tactics. The method of procedure has been reduced to a system. In the last Congress it was time and again asserted in debate that the end ultimately in view was the securing of legislation which would give what is known as the "dollar-a-day" pension to every man who, having served 90 days during the Civil War, had received an honorable discharge, and \$20 a month to the widows of such, regardless of the date of marriage. The so-called Sulloway bill, it was claimed, would "at once put at least 75 per cent. of all soldiers on the roll at \$30 per month, and the balance will receive a like amount before long." The widows, dependents, hospital nurses, teamsters, camp-followers generally, and even militia, were to follow, an endless procession — as long as the money held out!

The legislation thus immediately proposed, which would unquestionably have gone through could it have been brought to a vote, would easily have lifted the appropriation above the two-hundred-millions-a-year mark. Upon this the "flying" wedge was directed; but this again was merely an "entering" wedge. Judging by the experience of the past it can admit of no question that if the Sulloway bill had become a law, and the dollar-a-day pension basis had been established, the cry would next have been heard that the cost of living had so increased that a-dollar-and-a-half a day was in purchasing power now no more than a dollar a day at the time the measure was first advocated. The pensions should in "justice" be increased accordingly. Furthermore, under no measure yet even introduced, much less made law, has any attempt been made toward reducing to a system legislation

by special act covering individual cases. On the contrary, it was distinctly stated in the debate on the Sulloway bill, nor was the statement denied, that, if the most extreme of the present "blanket" measures were passed the future introduction of special acts would in no way be restricted. Rather, a new life would be infused into that vicious practice, but on a higher level.

Every bill, therefore, yet introduced has been of the "blanket" and "entering wedge" character — an instalment only.

The "flying wedge" is then brought into legislative play. All the forces behind every possible description of pension act, whether reported, contemplated, or hoped for, are concentrated in solid phalanx behind that measure which immediately holds the stage. That carried, the next is in order!

Next, thus in order, to the Sherwood Dollar-a-day bill — now actually reported and immediately impending — the measure known as the Volunteer Officers' Retired List affords in its history an apt illustration of the "entering wedge" tactics. This measure originated in 1905. On March 3, of that year, Gen. Joseph R. Hawley and Gen. P. J. Osterhaus, officers of the Volunteer Civil War service, were placed by special act on the pension roll as Major Generals "retired." A precedent was thus created; the narrow edge had been inserted. The principle was at once pronounced excellent; its further application was proposed. So the next year a bill was prepared and submitted, generalizing, but in moderation only, the exceptional case. Presented May 7, 1906, and referred to the Committee on Military Claims, this measure, strictly limited, had a most plausible sound. As such it appealed. In fact, as soon became apparent, it was only the second blow upon the wedge inserted the previous year. Under this bill (59th Congress, Document No. 489, reported June 13, 1906), it was proposed to create a special roll to be known as the Volunteer Retired List. A place upon this roll was limited to those 70 years and upward of age, who had, after an actual Civil War service of two and one half years, attained the rank of Major General or Brigadier General of Volunteers, or who, being field officers of volunteer regiments, had been brevetted Major General or Brigadier General. Eligibility to this roll was

very properly extended to all who, without reference to the length of their service, having attained the above rank, had in the line of duty sustained injuries of a specified character. Those on the roll were to be entitled to three fourths pay on the scale received by officers of like rank in the regular army. A somewhat imperfect list was prepared, assumedly containing the names of 191 persons reported as possible beneficiaries under this act, should it become law. The passage of the act, would, it was stated, involve an annual expenditure of about \$550,000; not, for the end in view and under the conditions set forth, a considerable or unreasonable addition to an annual pension appropriation exceeding \$150,000,000.

At first glance the measure commended itself. The length of service rendered — thirty months — the rank achieved — that of general — the age attained before becoming eligible as a beneficiary — 70 years — serving as guarantees, all established limitations. Here was honorable recognition and reasonable reward for exceptional service, long rendered. It soon became apparent, however, that this bill, in the form proposed, stood no chance of passage; and this on obvious grounds. For, whereas, a "blanket" pension bill covering enlisted men as well as officers would affect some six or eight hundred thousand voters, a bill which affected less than two hundred voters only, no matter how individually deserving, was plainly lacking in political merit; for, in considering proposed pension legislation, the voting strength of those affected is in the congressional mind the prime consideration. The measure now suggested went home to but half a vote on the average in each congressional district; argal, as Shakespeare's clown would have discoursed, it was undeserving of consideration. Though a strenuous effort was made toward the passage of this measure, nothing could be effected. Obviously, it was necessary to enlarge it. It would be purposeless here to follow it through its several subsequent stages. Annually brought up, and ever in a new and more attractive form pressed upon the notice of Congress, it made no progress; and so, gradually assuming new shape, it at last became thoroughly comprehensive — so to speak, broad-bottomed! The age limit

disappeared; the length of service was reduced; one after another, every grade of commissioned officer was included in its scope.

A little "log rolling" was also at this stage expedient. The consideration and passage of the measure could tacitly but most advantageously be combined with the consideration and passage of another "blanket" measure in favor of the enlisted man; a measure affecting, it was said, 800,000 beneficiaries, and adding \$55,000,000 to the pension payments. This was business! In thirty states of the Union the two measures would, if combined, probably affect an average of 3,000 beneficiaries in each congressional district; and, while it was true the establishing of the retired list alone would in those states probably affect on the average hardly more than one hundred voters in each district, yet they were active and influential voters!

In its final shape, and so accompanied, the original bill of 1906 had thus assumed a wholly new aspect. The measure as now framed applied to all ever having held a commission in the Civil War Volunteer Army, without regard to age, provided only that the entire term of service of the proposed beneficiary had exceeded six months. In other words, every individual who had received a commission during the Civil War and had served half a year or more, whether as enlisted man or officer, at the front or in the snug retirement of a recruiting office, was placed for the remainder of his life on the Retired Volunteer Officers' Pension Roll, with two thirds pay, quite irrespective of whether he had received injury during his period of service, which had to a degree already been provided for under other legislation, and without regard to his extraneous means of support. And yet it is safe to say that quite a large proportion of these proposed beneficiaries had, during their period of military service, been the recipients of larger salaries than had ever subsequently come their way.

The innocent looking, strictly limited measure introduced in 1906 had thus in 1910 become "blanket" legislation of the widest and most vicious character. As such, it was estimated that it would include 22,000 beneficiaries, instead of less than 200 as originally proposed, and, instead of \$550,000 a year, it would add \$14,600,000 to the annual pension roll of \$155,000,000. Though

favorably reported, this handsomely enlarged measure still failed in obtaining the necessary support. In other words, it did not even yet represent a sufficient number of votes to make its passage worth while in the average congressional estimate. Nor did the rank and file of the pension roll, so to speak, regard it with favor. In the eye of the enlisted man, the commissioned officer had already enjoyed sufficient advantages; he was in no way entitled to further favors. That the bill should again be recast, and reappear in a still more seductive form was reluctantly recognized as essential. This work was accordingly next taken in hand, and, on February 21, 1911, the measure was reported in the Senate in an entirely new and altogether more reasonable shape. It now included all surviving volunteer commissioned officers who had served during the Civil War for a term or terms aggregating two years. They were to receive a reasonable retiring allowance at a diminishing rate, running from \$900 per annum in the case of a colonel, or grades higher than colonel, those holding the same having served two years and more, to \$450 to lieutenants having served in excess of one year; *provided* that no ex-officer should be entitled to, or should receive the retired allowance until he should have arrived at the age of 70 years, nor until he should first make affidavit that his income, derived from private sources, including the income of his wife, did not exceed \$1200 per annum. It was estimated that the first year's net cost of the measure thus recast and limited would be approximately \$5,000,000 in excess of all pensions (\$3,000,000) now paid to the proposed beneficiaries under existing pension laws. It might apply in all, it was assumed, to about 15,000 persons; and right of admission to the roll without retired pay was very properly extended to all surviving officers who had served six months or more, irrespective of age or private income; a merely honorary recognition.

Reduced to this final form, the measure may be considered as now pending, and ready for consideration by the present Congress at its first regular session; that is, practically, after the passage of a previous "blanket" measure, satisfactory to a much larger number of the rank-and-file, has been secured. That has the

right of way! In the form it now bears, the Volunteer Officers' bill is plausible. Nevertheless, under the established and prescriptive system of pension legislation, this measure also if now passed, will in all human probability prove to be merely another stage of the Hawley-Osterhaus wedge. Once it becomes law, the cry will be raised — Why this discrimination between the list of the Regular Service and the Civil War Volunteer list? The limitation of age will hardly be swept away, because the number of the Civil War commissioned officers already less than 70 years old is inconsiderable. The other limitations would, however, one by one be removed, until finally all distinctions between the volunteer retired list and the regular army retired list would cease. The Hawley-Osterhaus precedent would, in the joint names of Justice and Honorable Recognition, be applied universally!

The arguments most confidently urged in its support are, if calmly considered from a detached point of view, the most curious feature in the very earnest advocacy of this measure by those interested in its passage. And apparently those who advance these arguments actually believe in them! They never weary of asserting, until they have convinced themselves, that the measure is one of right; that it merely carries out a solemn pledge made by Congress and confirmed by Abraham Lincoln during the first year of the Civil War (July, 1861) — a promise to the effect that those mustered into the volunteer Civil War service should be placed on the same footing as to pay and allowances as similar corps of the regular army. The proposed beneficiaries then go on somewhat strenuously to ask — "How has the Government kept this promise?" And it is pointed out that since 1866 Congress has passed various acts conferring honors and benefits on officers of the regular army, solely on account of their Civil War service; but has passed no acts of a similar character in favor of the officers of the volunteer service.

The passage of similar measures relating to the volunteer officers is next demanded as an act of simple justice — the redemption of a solemn contract volunteered by the Government when in dire need, etc., etc. The fact is conveniently ignored that no one of the several measures referred to applied to officers

of the regular service who had subsequent to the war been mustered out of that service. It applied only to officers of continued and consecutive service lasting until those to whom the acts applied had been retired for age or incapacity. No one of these acts applied to those who had been mustered out, least of all those who had been mustered out more than forty years before at their own request and in order that they might enter upon other occupations which at the time had seemed to them likely to be more remunerative, or in other respects desirable. There is, consequently, no analogy whatever between the two cases, and no pledge was ever made which the Government can justly be called upon now to redeem. Regulars and volunteers are on precisely the same footing. Yet those who would be beneficiaries under the proposed act have actually argued themselves into a firm belief that, in demanding a great preference, they are merely insisting upon the fulfilment of an obligation which has up to date been unduly and unrighteously withheld!

A similar analogy is drawn between the officers of the Civil War and the officers of the, so-called, Revolutionary army, wholly oblivious again of the fact that there is no real analogy between the two cases. No benefits or pensions of any description were conferred upon the officers of the Revolutionary army until the lapse of close upon half a century after that struggle closed. During the Civil War the officers of the volunteer army were paid, as were the officers of the regular army, what belonged to the grades they held in the legal-tender money then in use — "the blood-sealed greenback," as the beloved and congressionally consecrated monetary medium of that period was designated — which possessed a recognized value. The officers of the Revolutionary army, on the contrary, were paid in a continental money, constantly depreciating and finally altogether valueless. Every officer of the Civil War who has seen fit to claim it has since been the recipient of a regular pension, the same as that of the enlisted man. No real analogy, therefore, exists between the two cases; and yet the analogy is constantly urged, as if it were perfect at every point, and as if a right conceded to the officers of the earlier struggle had been denied to those of the

later. In other words, a Preference is importunately demanded in the names of Justice and Equality!

Such, as respects pensions, is the system of progressive, patch-work, instalment-plan, blanket legislation which has been pursued for the last forty years, and is still being pursued. Nor is any end in sight, or limit proposed. It simply feeds on itself — and \$150,000,000 a year of public money, soon to be \$200,000,000! Under such circumstances, what the occasion now calls for is obvious. It calls, and it calls imperatively, for some measure of a wholly new character — at once constructive, definite, and final. A measure which will discharge the overloaded and groaning committees of Congress from all further consideration of pension acts, general or special. The framing of such a measure should also, it would seem, be easy; nor in framing it would it be necessary to tax the knowledge or ingenuity of the congressional Committee on Invalid Pensions. On the contrary, such a measure would best be prepared under instruction and for the use of that committee in the Pension Bureau and the office of the Adjutant-General. Then, prepared by experts in the full light of a vast accumulated experience, it would be so framed as to make provision, at once suitable and liberal, for all ordinary classes, as also to provide for cases of exceptional hardship. The business of Congress is to legislate, not sit as a tribunal, whether executive, administrative, judicial, or eleemosynary.

The first existing condition manifestly calling for attention in such a measure would be a purging of the roll. It is useless to assert, as is generally asserted, that no purging of the roll in the case is necessary; or that, so far as it is necessary, the machinery for it already exists. Neither statement is true. During the year closing June 30 last, in consequence of repeated allegations of extensive fraud, the Commissioner of Pensions has instituted what he terms a "checking of the pension roll." It amounts, however, to nothing more than the ascertainment that, in the localities selected for investigation, the person receiving the pension was actually the person entitled to draw it. Beyond that somewhat immaterial consideration there was no attempt to go. The charge is that in this, as in all similar cases, the inducement

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to fraud has begotten fraud. Measures of a more searching and drastic character are called for, and, in the case of a private company engaged in the business of insurance or the payment of annuities, would be in use. But even allowing that a machinery, such as it is, for the elimination of fraud already exists and is in use, the charge is made, and moreover is supported by reference to cases judicially and otherwise exposed, that the existing pension roll is largely factitious, built upon perjury, misrepresentation, and evasion. Notoriously, it is a sealed book. Within the last year it has been, in private, confidently asserted by officers of the Government, than whom none have better means of reaching a correct conclusion, that if the existing roll were as thoroughly purged as a similar roll would be by a private business organization, the amount paid out thereunder would be reduced by one half.

Such cases as the following, too numerous to specify, are on record and have in course of recent debate been brought to the notice of Congress. A responsible man, himself a veteran of the war, wrote from a town in Ohio that he "could name at least twenty men in the same company to which he belonged who are receiving under special pension acts \$24 a month, and who never stood in line of battle." Still another case was specified on the floor of the last House of a man "who enlisted in 1864, got a big bounty, stayed in the hospital until discharged, never fired a gun or did a day's duty at the front, came home, was examined, was pensioned at \$12 per month for the last stages of consumption, and is living yet." A system under which such abuses exist, and are practically connived at, is one not improperly characterized as a "system which offers every possible inducement to mendicancy and conceals every possible inducement to fraud."

Without going into the exact truth, or possible exaggeration, of such statements, it should be sufficient that they are made, publicly made, and in congressional debate. The pension beneficiaries, in this respect resembling all other recipients of public money, should be peculiarly sensitive under such imputations. Demanding inquiry, they should challenge searching investiga-

tion. The pension roll, it is claimed, is one of honor. If it be one of honor, those who discredit it by their presence should be exposed, and their names stricken therefrom.

The first and obvious step to this end would be publicity. The fullest light should be let on. This would be brought about by the annual publication of a list of pensioners, indicating in each case the name, place of residence, and the amount of which the beneficiary is in regular receipt. It should be by state, county, and congressional district, town and ward, the appeal being to persons dwelling in the immediate vicinage of the recipient.

Against this most obvious remedial measure two arguments are advanced — arguments singularly contradictory as well as futile. In fact, in this respect as in others when pensions are in question, great mental ingenuity is displayed in the invention of objections to any measure looking to public enlightenment. In the first place, the pension roll is proclaimed a roll of honor. It is then, however, immediately argued that the acceptance of public money savors of pauperism, and places the recipient thereof somewhat in the position of a mendicant. His presence on the roll is, in some respects, agreeable; but, savoring of charity, they prefer it should not be disclosed. In other words, the roll altogether ceases to be one of honor! "Veterans" are sensitive; and their sense of delicacy should not be so outraged. Next, and with increasing ingenuity, it is asserted that the publication of such a roll subjects those whose names thereon appear to receiving applications from attorneys, "green-goods" men, dealers in quack medicines, and other well-known solicitors of patronage, and in this way subjects the battle-scarred veteran to unnecessary annoyances; which, however, are shared in common by them with the ten to twelve thousand persons whose names appear in "Who's Who in America" and other similar publications.

The simple fact is that those advancing these ingenious arguments, as well as others of similar character, do so for the excellent reason that they well know the existing pension roll would not bear the glare of the limelight. Cases of fraud by the thousand would, it is alleged, at once become patent, were that light let on. Those who take a proper pride in the presence of their

names upon the roll of honor should on this score alone demand that the roll be made public.

Finally, it is urged that this and the other measures proposed involve an annual expenditure of large sums, which had much better be saved and given to the veteran under the "blanket" system, without formal examination or prying inquiry into the particular case. Any private corporation distributing annually considerable amounts in the form of pensions to superannuated employees, or employees injured in the service of the company, would unquestionably consider 5 per cent. of the amount distributed well expended in the work of administering its relief. Were 5 per cent. of the United States pension appropriations so expended it would amount to no less than the absurdly unnecessary sum of \$8,000,000 a year. One half of that amount would amply provide for all existing Pension Bureau expenses and also pay the cost of the most drastic investigation, including the annual publication of the roll of beneficiaries. The argument for economy through dispensing with effective administrative work is merely a cover for a public expenditure fraudulently profuse.

Publicity and the consequent purging of the roll being then first provided for, the next step would be to prepare, in the light of the experience of fifty years, a definitive and comprehensive measure understood to be of a final character, covering all possible cases and classes of cases, both ordinary and exceptional. It is useless to argue that such a measure is difficult of preparation. All the material necessary for framing it must have been accumulated, and is now in the hands of bureaus and officials amply competent to frame a measure accordingly. It only needs that they should be set to work. That the ordinary member of a Committee on Invalid Pensions is not qualified, or in any respect competent, to prepare so complex a measure, is obvious. He has not the knowledge of precedents and statistics, nor could he devote to the framing of the bill the necessary amount of time and thought. It should be prepared to his hand; taking the place of one of those slipshod "blanket" measures so discreditable to legislators, but which committees seem always ready to accept and report.

The course now to be pursued by the honestly sympathetic but yet conscientious Congressman would thus seem tolerably plain. When the next bill providing for an indiscriminate increase of pensions is proposed, he should not oppose it as a measure of relief to the "worthy soldier" and "veteran," but, objecting to its form, he should ask that it be referred back to the committee reporting it, with instructions to prepare a bill of a definitive character, understood to be final as well as comprehensive, covering all cases which a century's experience has shown likely to arise; the same to be reported as a substitute for the last pending specimen of "blanket" legislation. After all these years and in the face of such an accumulation of experience, involving more than four thousand millions of public money already actually disbursed, no measure, not so framed and reported as final, is entitled to respectful consideration.

Finally, a comprehensive measure, understood to be definitive, and as such doing away with all necessity for future congressional action, having been prepared, it would remain to provide the administrative machinery necessary to its effective working. This should not be difficult. It was, in fact, clearly pointed out in the debate on the Sulloway bill by Mr. Payne of New York. The committee in its report had complained in terms already referred to of being hopelessly overworked; it was unable by utmost exertion — "day and night" put forth — to dispose of more than one in fifty of the cases referred to it. In reply Mr. Payne said that, if the committee was not able to reach all these "distressing cases," he wished to point out to them that, by "enacting into general law the rules which they enforce when bills are brought before that committee, giving the administration of it to the Pension Bureau, they would relieve the committee of the consideration of nearly all these cases." To enact into law "the rules adopted by the pension committees of the two houses, under which they are reporting special bills, and give the Commissioner of Pensions authority to grant pensions in accordance with those rules would be far more just than the passage of the 'blanket' bill then pending. The affidavits which are now

examined hastily by the committees, from the necessities of the case, would then have to undergo the scrutiny of the Pension Bureau, and the facts could be far more easily and accurately established." Such a disposition of the matter would, however, it must be confessed, be inconsistent with the economical theories, more popular in the congressional mind, advanced in the same debate by a Representative from Ohio. This gentleman thus expressed himself: "I would, in a spirit of real economy abolish the brass ornaments and expensive machinery of the Pension Bureau, muster out the army of agents, examiners, and medical boards, and then grant without question a pension to every Civil War veteran holding an honorable discharge or being able to satisfactorily account for its absence. Thus would millions be saved annually to the Government which it now expends in useless salaries."

The administrative method here suggested has certainly the merit of simplicity. It would effectually do away with every barrier to a free access to the Treasury. The most ardent supporter of pension appropriations could hardly ask for more. On this head, however, the gentleman just quoted is hardly entitled to the consideration which properly belongs to Mr. Payne. That, however, the Committee on Invalid Pensions will, or any other congressional committee similarly situated would, take such a rational view of the subject as that suggested by him can scarcely be hoped; for, under the legislative system now in vogue, the Committee on Invalid Pensions has a larger patronage at its disposal than probably any other committee of Congress, perhaps larger than all others. Able to report favorably, or to refuse to act, on any one of some 30,000 applications for pensions on its files, with the number increased by many hundreds each legislative week, the members of that committee can exercise a political influence most considerable. That they should willingly divest themselves of it, is scarcely to be hoped. They can be divested of it only by action from without; but, until they are divested of it, the abuse of special pension legislation, which has now grown to unprecedented dimension, cannot be corrected. None the less, the simple measure alone necessary for its correction is

obvious. Mr. Paine pointed it out, and his remarks in so doing can be found in the *Record*.*

Tribunals would thus be provided sufficient in number to insure reasonably prompt action on all cases which presented themselves; and to them, by standing rule, would be referred every application of exceptional character. Such tribunals would be in the nature of a Court of Claims. Instead of the committee undertaking to pass upon the individual application, the members of it thus assuming judicial or administrative functions, it would confine itself to proper legislative work. Framing and enacting general rules, it would receive each application for special relief, refer the same at once to the proper branch of the Pension Bureau, by which the application would be intelligently and locally passed upon, and the applicant either refused or given that measure of relief provided in the general act.

Could such a system as that here outlined be adopted even at this late day, it would do away with the necessity of any further pension legislation, whether blanket or individual. The Committee on Invalid Pensions would be at once relieved of its congestion — its groans would cease for lack of occasion therefor. This result attained, it would be of comparatively little importance how liberal, within reason, the provisions of the general and definitive act might be, or what addition it might make to the present drain upon the Treasury. The “entering wedge” and instalment-plan system would be brought to an end; but, until that system is brought to an end, no reduction of the pension roll disbursements can be expected. On this point no one can longer either be deceived or deceive himself. It is always and regularly admitted that the present appropriation is large and the amount already expended, running into the billions, is beyond human comprehension. Yet it is argued with wearisome iteration that the additional relief now provided is but temporary, and within the next ten years will cease through the death-rate. Nothing of the sort will occur. Under the existing system every year new acts will be reported and passed, and ever increasing recourse had to special

*The speech of Mr. Payne is in the *Record* of January 17, 1911; pp. 10, 33—34. The rules referred to of the Committee on Invalid Pensions are to be found in the *Record* of January 16, 1911; p. 958.

acts. The future will, in this respect, be merely a repetition of the past. This slovenly makeshift and manifest fraud should stop; and stop now. Were it made to stop, the life of the pension system would admit of actuarial computation. The process of regular reduction and ultimate extinction would begin, and could be figured to a nicety. For instance, take the measure already referred to, introduced in the last Congress, and providing for a Volunteer Officers' Retired List. It was estimated that under the proposed bill there would be at first 21,995 possible beneficiaries. The annual reduction which would occur was then computed, with the result that, while the measure would, in 1911, call for an appropriation of \$13,521,393, in 1912 the amount required under it would be reduced to \$179,940. There would then remain only 243 beneficiaries.

Under any well-considered measure of constructive legislation it should be the same with the general pension list. To-day there are upon that list more than 900,000 names. Of these, it is computed, some 40,000 and upward are dropped from natural causes each year. The computation is, however, to a degree deceptive. If even such a proportion were maintained the existing roll would practically disappear during the life of the next generation. We all know nothing of the sort will take place, and that the last name will hardly have been removed from that roll when the twenty-first century is ushered in. On this head, the experience of the Revolutionary past is instructive.

Any such action as that here outlined — action at once obvious, simple, effective, and economical of the public money — is most improbable; and it is made improbable by the condition of affairs which admits of easy illustration. In the course of the debate of January last on the Sulloway bill (*Record*, Jan. 10, 1911; p. 750), one member voiced his opposition in few words, closing thus — "Yet I want to say this here and now, though I realize the effect of my vote upon this question, that \$50,000,000 a year is too big a price for the country to pay to bring me back to Congress." The nail was here hit on the head; but the average member of the House is not afflicted with any similar excess of modesty. In his estimation no price seems to be too consider-

able to pay for his retention in Congress, provided always the money paid to bring that result about comes not out of his private resources, but from the National Treasury. Hence in the same debate another member proclaimed himself not only in favor of the pending measure — the dollar-a-day pension — but also of the most unquestioning private legislation in addition thereto, and the sweeping away of all limitation of the date of marriage in the case of soldiers' widows and increasing the amount in such cases to \$20 per month. Obviously, a somewhat excessive premium on immorality; but it, also, meant votes! Furthermore, he advocated the extension of this beneficent system to cover all the militia of the war period, who, though "never technically mustered into the service of the United States," yet "served their country." Those men, he claimed, "should in justice and honor be granted military status and the accruing benefits." Here was indeed a bid for votes! It included not only the aged and war-worn veterans and the "spring chicken" relict, but that body of participants known in civic processions as "citizens generally." This gentleman evidently set not fifty, but a hundred and fifty millions a year as the value to the country of a retention of his presence in the national council chamber.

The case of this member will, however, sufficiently exemplify what the particular measure then under discussion — the Sulloway bill — meant as a political factor in a single district — *ex pede, Herculem!* In the absence of a detailed statement it is not possible to specify the aggregate number of pensioners, or the number of pensioners of each description, resident in the district in question. The average number in each district of the state, which the member in part represented, is almost exactly 2,300. Assuming that his particular district did not fall behind the average, it is not unfair to assume that one half at least of those receiving pensions were "veterans," and would be beneficiaries under the provisions of the measure then pending. The average amount of the pension paid under the existing law is \$15.00 a month; this it was proposed to double in the case of the beneficiaries under the pending measure, making it \$30.00 a month. The net result would be that in this particular district

the passage of the Sulloway bill meant the gratuitous disbursement among the voters of an additional sum of \$17,000 a month, a similar sum being already disbursed, or \$200,000 per annum in addition to the \$200,000 provided by existing law. The plurality received by the member in question at the last election was 2,500 in a total vote of 46,000. Comment is unnecessary; the inference suggests itself.

There are at this time two senatorial scandals exciting much public attention. Of these, one involves the use made of a fund of \$50,000 raised to effect the result; the other the use made of a sum of \$117,000 furnished by the successful candidate for senatorial honors. The two amounts seem large; the last so excessive as to be scandalous. Here, however, is a sum of \$200,000 a year — \$400,000 for a single congressional term — voted by a member out of the National Treasury “to bring me back to Congress.” And in his view, even this does not suffice! The alleged corruption funds so interminably discussed in the Lorimer and Stephenson cases sink into insignificance.

As already observed at the commencement of this series of papers, the party of political opposition elected under a mandate to restrict a too profuse public expenditure, is now in control of the National House of Representatives. Measures are pending looking to the increase of the present appropriation for payment of pensions merely because of the age of the recipients thereof, from \$157,000,000 a year to \$225,000,000 and more. “Progressive” measures are in agitation and warmly advocated which, if they become law, would increase this amount to \$250,000,000. An average sum of \$600,000 to be each year gratuitously disbursed in every congressional district of the entire country! The measure immediately impending involves the additional gratuitous annual disbursement of approximately \$175,000 in each of the congressional districts of the more northern section of the country; the more southern section will not participate in it to any considerable extent. Each of its districts may possibly get from it \$2,000 a year — crumbs from the table! At the close of the opening session of the present Congress, Mr. Underwood, the leader of the Democratic party, on the floor of the House

declared, in language already quoted, that "This House is pledged to reform the administration of public affairs and to retrench public expenditures. . . . Not a dollar will be appropriated which a careful investigation does not demonstrate should be expended in a wise, efficient and effective administration of public affairs." The issue will soon be presented, and it remains to be seen whether the gratuitous expenditure of seventy-five millions a year in addition to the \$157,000,000 already provided, "to bring Me back to Congress," is in the estimation of a majority of the present House of Representatives, a sum "expended in a wise, efficient and effective administration of public affairs."

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

PENSIONS GRANTED BY SPECIAL ACT DURING THE THIRD SESSION OF THE SIXTY-FIRST CONGRESS

RATES SPECIFIED	NUMBER GRANTED	RATES SPECIFIED	NUMBER GRANTED
\$60.....	1	\$14.....	1
\$55.....	1	\$12.....	211
\$50.....	44	\$10.....	3
\$40.....	84	\$6.....	4
\$36.....	132	Inoperative:	
\$35.....	4	\$50.....	2
\$30.....	1,116	\$36.....	3
\$27.....	1	\$30.....	20
\$25.....	14	\$24.....	16
\$24.....	1,636	\$20.....	3
\$20.....	212	\$15.....	1
\$18.....	1	\$12.....	3
\$17.....	6		
\$16.....	58	Total.....	3,586
\$15.....	9		

PENSIONS OF THE SEVERAL WARS AND OF THE PEACE ESTABLISHMENT

The amounts that have been paid for pensions to soldiers, sailors, and marines, their widows, minor children, and dependent relatives on account of military and naval service in the several wars and in the regular service since the foundation of the Government to June 30, 1911, are as follows:

War of the Revolution (estimate).....	\$70,000,000.00
War of 1812 (service pension).....	45,853,024.19
Indian Wars (service pension).....	11,192,205.52
War with Mexico (service pension).....	45,279,686.83
Civil War.....	3,985,719,836.93
War with Spain and insurrection in Philippine Islands.....	34,142,976.37
Regular establishment.....	21,705,852.33
Unclassified.....	16,488,147.99

Total disbursements for pensions.....\$4,230,381,730.16

APPENDIX

DISBURSEMENTS FOR PENSIONS AND FOR MAINTENANCE OF PENSION SYSTEM, 1866 TO 1911

FISCAL YEAR	PAID AS PENSIONS	COST, MAINTENANCE AND EXPENSES	TOTAL	NUMBER OF PENSIONERS
1866.....	\$15,450,549.88	\$407,165.00	\$15,857,714.88	126,722
1867.....	20,784,789.69	490,977.35	21,275,767.04	155,474
1868.....	23,101,509.36	553,020.34	23,654,529.70	169,643
1869.....	28,513,247.27	564,526.81	29,077,774.08	187,963
1870.....	29,351,488.78	600,997.86	29,952,486.64	198,686
1871.....	28,518,792.62	863,079.00	29,381,871.62	207,495
1872.....	29,752,746.81	951,253.00	30,703,999.81	232,229
1873.....	26,982,063.89	1,003,200.64	27,985,264.53	238,411
1874.....	30,206,778.99	966,794.13	31,173,573.12	236,241
1875.....	29,270,404.76	982,695.35	30,253,100.11	234,821
1876.....	27,936,209.53	1,015,078.81	28,951,288.34	232,137
1877.....	28,182,821.72	1,034,459.33	29,217,281.05	232,104
1878.....	26,786,009.44	1,032,500.09	27,818,509.53	223,998
1879.....	33,664,428.92	837,734.14	34,502,163.06	242,755
1880.....	56,689,229.08	935,027.28	57,624,256.36	250,829
1881.....	50,583,405.35	1,072,059.64	51,655,464.99	268,830
1882.....	54,313,172.05	1,466,236.01	55,779,408.06	285,697
1883.....	60,427,573.81	2,591,648.29	63,019,222.10	303,658
1884.....	57,912,387.47	2,385,181.00	60,297,568.47	322,756
1885.....	65,171,937.12	3,392,576.34	68,564,513.46	345,125
1886.....	64,091,142.90	3,245,016.61	67,336,159.51	365,783
1887.....	73,752,997.08	3,753,400.91	77,506,397.99	406,007
1888.....	78,950,501.67	3,515,057.27	82,465,558.94	452,557
1889.....	88,842,720.58	3,466,968.40	92,309,688.98	489,725
1890.....	106,093,850.39	3,526,382.13	109,620,232.52	537,944
1891.....	117,312,690.50	4,700,636.44	122,013,326.94	676,160
1892.....	139,394,147.11	4,898,665.80	144,292,812.91	876,068
1893.....	156,906,637.94	4,867,734.42	161,774,372.36	966,012
1894.....	139,986,726.17	3,963,976.31	143,950,702.48	969,544
1895.....	139,812,294.30	4,338,020.21	144,150,314.51	970,524
1896.....	138,220,704.46	3,991,375.61	142,212,080.07	970,678
1897.....	139,949,717.35	3,987,783.07	143,937,500.42	976,014
1898.....	144,651,879.80	4,114,091.46	148,765,971.26	993,714
1899.....	138,355,052.95	4,147,517.73	142,502,570.68	991,519
1900.....	138,462,130.65	3,841,706.74	142,303,887.39	993,529
1901.....	138,531,483.84	3,868,795.44	142,400,279.28	997,735
1902.....	137,504,267.99	3,831,378.96	141,335,646.95	999,446
1903.....	137,759,653.71	3,993,216.79	141,752,870.50	996,545
1904.....	141,093,571.49	3,849,366.25	144,942,937.74	994,762
1905.....	141,142,861.33	3,721,832.82	144,864,694.15	998,441
1906.....	139,000,288.25	3,523,269.51	142,523,557.76	985,971
1907.....	138,155,412.46	3,309,110.44	141,464,522.90	967,371
1908.....	153,093,086.27	2,800,963.36	155,894,049.63	951,687
1909.....	161,973,703.77	2,852,583.73	164,826,287.50	946,194
1910.....	159,974,056.08	2,657,673.86	162,631,729.94	921,083
1911.....	157,325,160.35	2,517,127.06	159,842,287.41	892,098
Total.....	4,133,936,285.93	120,879,861.74	4,254,816,147.67	

APPENDIX

PENSIONERS ON THE ROLL JUNE 30, 1911, AND JUNE 30, 1910

	1911	1910	GAIN	LOSS
Revolutionary War:				
Daughter.....		1		1
War of 1812:				
Widows.....	279	338		59
Indian Wars:				
Survivors.....	1,387	1,560		173
Widows.....	2,629	2,822		193
War with Mexico:				
Survivors.....	1,639	2,042		403
Widows.....	5,982	6,359		377
Civil War:				
Act Feb. 6, 1907 —				
Survivors.....	356,830	362,433		5,603
General Law —				
Invalids.....	113,063	121,581		8,518
Widows.....	67,509	70,587		3,078
Minor Children.....	385	445		60
Mothers.....	1,877	2,391		514
Fathers.....	278	368		90
Brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters.....	353	300	53	
Helpless children.....	508	533		25
Act June 27, 1890 —				
Invalids.....	59,991	78,601		18,610
Minor children.....	3,983	4,009		26
Helpless children.....	375	335	40	
Act Apr. 19, 1908 —				
Widows.....	228,198	220,826	7,372	
Army nurses.....	406	442		36
War with Spain:				
Invalids.....	23,383	22,783	600	
Widows.....	1,217	1,183	34	
Minor children.....	326	330		4
Mothers.....	3,032	3,072		40
Fathers.....	522	512	10	
Brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters.....	9	7	2	
Helpless children.....	1	2		1
Regular establishment:				
Invalids.....	13,757	13,180	577	
Widows.....	2,799	2,727	72	
Minor children.....	149	136	13	
Mothers.....	1,066	1,011	55	
Fathers.....	152	152		
Brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters.....	8	7	1	
Helpless children.....	5	8		3
Total.....	892,098	921,083	8,829	37,814
Net loss.....				28,985

The number of soldiers and sailors on the pension roll at the close of the year was 570,050, the number of dependents and widows was 321,642, and the number of army nurses was 406

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